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Abstract 
This paper analyzes financial intermediation of two types of NGOs and assesses their 
complementarity or substitutability for the functions previously performed by indigenous self-
help village groups (kafos) in The Gambia. The emergence of NGOs providing village level 
services is found to be only a partial substitute for the financial functions traditionally 
performed by these indigenous village groups. Institutional duality is, therefore, observed 
due to the coexistence of indigenous village groups alongside the NGOs providing multiple 
services demanded by villagers. The complementarity or substitutability of NGOs for kafos 
is largely determined by their institutional design for the provision of financial services. 
NGO programs that provide financial services based on lessons learned from kafos tend to 
complement rather than substitute for the kafos. The villagers seem better served this way. 
These findings have implications for any interventions which disrupt but only partially 
substitute for traditional village arrangements and institutions. 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION BY NGOS IN THE GAMBIA: 
A COMPLEMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE FOR INDIGENOUS 
SELF-HELP VILLAGE GROUPS? 
by 
Geetha Nagarajan, Richard L Meyer and Douglas H. Graham.1 
Indigenous self-help groups need to develop in their own tempo, follow their 
own rules and preserve their own cultural identity. Any outside interference 
into them might only work counterproductively - Frits Bouman. 
I. Introduction 
Subsaharan African (SSA) countries report a variety of indigenous self-help informal 
groups at the village level (Bouman).2 In The Gambia such groups are called~ and 
they are multifunctional, voluntary and usually homogenous in terms of members' age, 
ethnicity, gender and occupation but have various membership sizes.3 These kafos provide 
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2 These village groups are called as demisenu tons in Mali, 1Qn.s. in Senegal, and li.kfu: 
in Ethiopia (Aredo; Dupuy). Similar indigenous village groups are also found under 
different names in other Mrican countries including Zaire (Slover and Cuevas) and 
Cameroon (Schrieder and Cuevas). 
3 Kafo is a Mandinka word that roughly corresponds to ~ or compin in Fula and 
morom in Wolof in The Gambia(Shipton). 
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multiple services that include insurance, financial intermediation, labor exchange, and social 
and political services (Carney; Shipton).4 
Kafos traditionally fill in for missing markets by providing several services including 
financial intermediation. Recently, there has been an emergence of non-governmental orga-
nizations (N GOs ), frequently linked to international agencies, that are rapidly expanding the 
scale and scope of their village-level operations. The NGOs that provide only financial 
intermediation in the villages may, however, either complement or substitute for traditional 
kafo activities. Depending on whether or not the NGOs are effective complements or sub-
stitutes, the kafos may either disappear or may become transformed and coexist with the 
NGOs. The traditional kafos have an explicit village welfare objective that insures marginal 
populations. The disappearance or trasformation of kafos may spell the end of access to 
village contingency and welfare funds for these populations. Villagers with more assets, 
however, may find they are better served by NGOs than they were by traditional kafos. As 
a result, the overall welfare of the village may be either enhanced or diminished by the 
NGOs. 
The way NGOs design their programs will determine whether or not they 
complement or substitute for traditional kafo activities. Kafos are customized to suit the 
requirements of their members and therefore their operational design reveal the preferences 
of their members. The majority of NGOs operate with heterogenous operational 
philosophies conceived by their external donors. This has resulted in diverse institutional 
4 See Nagarajan, Meyer and Ouattara for a discussion on the evolution of kafos in The 
Gambia. 
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designs used to provide financial services in villages. Whereas some NGOs design their 
programs around the savings first approach, others follow the classical supply leading credit 
first approach. Furthermore, while some NGOs operate independent of kafos, others try to 
use kafos (either existing or specifically organized) as conduits to provide financial services 
(Graham et al).5 Consequently, the terms and conditions for the provision of financial 
services by NGOs may cause positive or negative externality problems. For example, NGOs 
may provide individual loans from external funds at zero interest rates using the kafos as 
conduits which disrupts the traditional kafos that usually charge a positive interest rate on 
loans made from internally mobilized funds. This could cause the villagers to depend on 
cheap external funds and destroy local savings mobilization. 
This paper provides some insights on whether complementing and/ or substituting of 
kafo activities by NGOs leads to pareto improvement or to the destruction of traditional 
structures that worsen the welfare of the village.6 Specifically, the paper assesses the 
implications of NGO institutional designs on welfare in Gambian villages by examining if 
these NGOs complement or substitute for traditional kafo activities. The analysis is based 
on a purposive survey of the functions performed by 15 kafos in five villages where two 
NGOs with different institutional designs are active in The Gambia. 
5 It has been argued that targeting groups rather than individuals shifts two costs from 
the financial intermediaries to the borrowers: (i) borrower screening costs, and (ii) 
monitoring costs thus reducing transaction costs and repayment problems (Stiglitz; Varian). 
Empirical evidence from developing countries, however, show mixed results in loan 
repayment performance where groups have been used (Huppi and Feder). 
6 Pareto improvement is realized if no one is made worse off by making at least one 
person better off. 
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II. NGOs and Traditional VIllage Groups: A Conceptual Discussion of Substitutes and 
Complements 
In general, complementary elements are those that mutually supply each others 
inability to fill out or complete an activity, while substitutes are those that replace the 
function of another element in an activity. The ability of an element to effectively 
complement or substitute for another element has consequences for the final outcome of 
an activity. This section sets the guidelines under which NGOs and traditional village 
groups complement or substitute for each other and consequently affect the overall welfare 
of the community. 
NGOs typically tend to offer only limited financial services in a village, such as 
deposit mobilization and/ or production loans, compared to the multiple services provided 
by traditional kafos that include insurance, financial intermediation, labor exchange and 
social services. While loans from NGOs can function as an insurance substitute, kafos 
extend individual and aggregate insurance through several mechanisms that include informal 
savings and contingency credit services, and social relationships that ensure mutual help.7 
Therefore, the entry of NGOs into rural financial markets might either substitute for or 
complement all or part of the traditional kafo functions. Furthermore, the use of kafos as 
conduits for NGO loan programs may induce a shift in the relative importance within and 
among the functions performed by traditional kafos. Consequently, kafos may either 
disappear entirely due in part to a darwinian process of complete substitution or institutional 
7 See Eswaran and Kotwal for a discussion of role of credit as an insurance mechanism 
in peasant economies. 
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duality may occur with the coexistence of kafos and NGOs that together provide all the 
services demanded by villagers.8 
The provision of financial services by NGOs, on the one hand, may result in three 
types of substitution effects: (i) they can cause the disappearance of traditional kafos by 
completely substituting for all their services, or (ii) they may only substitute for .iUl the 
financial services provided by the kafos leading to a shift among functions as kafos 
discontinue their financial function, or (iii) they may partially substitute for £2!M of the 
financial functions of the kafo leading to a shift within the set of financial services as the 
kafos continue only the financial functions not substituted by the NGO. In other words, 
NGOs will diminish or displace the traditional kafos only if their financial services are 
perfect substitutes for the financial, insurance and other services provided by a kafo. 
Otherwise, institutional duality will occur with the coexistence of kafos and NGOs 
simultaneously providing multiple services because NGOs only represent an incomplete or 
partial substitute for traditional kafos. For example, if the NGOs provide all types of 
financial services including deposit services, consumption and production credit at attractive 
terms and conditions, then kafos may discontinue providing such services and emphasize 
other services not met by NGOs. This will result in shifts among kafo services. However, 
if NGOs provide only production credit, then kafos may coexist with NGOs to provide 
deposit services and consumption credit. 
8 A darwinian process refers to the elimination of the weakest due to the survival of the 
fittest. 
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The provision of financial services by NGOs, on the other hand, may only 
complement the insurance and financial services of kafos so they continue to perform these 
functions efficiently. In brief, NGOs may offer deposit services for kafo funds and 
untargeted credit to the kafo as a group clientele at an attractive interest rate. In this 
fashion, NGOs also increase their pool of resources through deposits mobilized from kafos. 
As a result, institutional duality will emerge with the coexistence of NGOs and kafos in the 
same village but with a healthy symbiotic relationship between the kafos and NGOs 
resulting in a positive sum welfare game. 
The emergence of NGOs as financial intermediaries can provide an efficient 
alternative financial system to villagers in a country, such as The Gambia, where formal 
financial institutions provide few services in rural areas. The use of kafos to channel NGO 
financial services may (i) increase the pool of resources available to the kafos, and (ii) 
improve loan repayment rates and reduce transaction costs in mobilizing savings for NGOs.9 
In this way, NGOs and kafos can be complementary in a pareto improving way resulting in 
a positive sum game. NGOs may also cost effectively substitute for some or all of the kafo 
financial services leading to more efficient use of kafo resources in alternative services. This 
may also result in a pareto improvement or at least no welfare loss. Substitution, however, 
can be counterproductive if NGOs (i) create negative externalities by providing financial 
9 Rural households, especially women engaged in vegetable farming, often save in small 
quantities at frequent intervals (Shipton). The transaction costs involved in mobilizing these 
small but frequent funds on an individual basis are often high for financial intermediaries. 
A group of savers such as a kafo can, however, collectively deposit a larger amount and thus 
reduce transaction costs for the financial intermediaries. This will also reduce savers' 
transaction costs which are high due to high travel costs incurred in going to the nearest 
bank branch. 
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services that destroy the carefully built institutional safeguards of the kafo~~ or (ii) reorient 
traditional kafo functions of kafos through the deterioration or discontinuation of traditional 
insurance mechanisms that are especially useful to marginal populations but are not offered 
by the NGOs. In this case, the substituting of kafo functions by NGOs will result in an 
aggregate welfare loss in the village. Equity considerations which are often the basic 
principles of kafos are then exchanged for efficiency considerations. Therefore, the 
substitution of NGOs for kafos may be counterproductive. 
The discussion above showed that the net effect of NGOs offering financial services 
previosly provided by traditional kafos can lead either to a positive or negative sum game. 
The next section tests these postulates in the Gambia. 
III. Empirical Evidence from The Gambia 
The objective of this research was to examine the implications of provision of 
financial services by NGOs on the functions of traditional self-help village groups in The 
Gambia. NGOs began offering financial services in the Gambia in the late 1980s. Presently 
there are a total of 14 NGOs following diverse approaches in supplying financial services 
in rural and peri-urban villages (Graham et al.,). We purposely selected for study two 
NGOs, Centre International de Developpment et de Recherche (CIDR) and Action Aid of 
the Gambia (AATG), that provide fmancial services in The Gambia. This was done for two 
reasons: (i) these NGOs are active in rural areas where the majority of kafos are found, and 
(ii) the institutional design followed by these NGOs are substantially different to allow for 
interesting comparisons. Whereas Action Aid is a nationwide program, the CIDR only 
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provided technical assistance to six villages in the Jahally-Pacharr area to set up village 
savings and credit associations (VISACAs).10 We hereafter refer to CIDR as VISACAs 
and Action Aid, The Gambia as Action Aid. Of these six VISACA villages, five are also 
serviced by Action Aid. Therefore, we selected a total of five villages for the study where 
both VISACAs and Action Aid are active. Information was gathered through interviews 
designed to collect data on kafo activities in the sample villages during February-April of 
1993. None of the sample villages was serviced by any formal financial institution, although 
one village was eligible for production credit from the Gambia Cooperative Union. 
L The Characteristics of the VISACA and Action Aid Programs 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the institutional design followed by 
VISACAs and Action Aid. Action Aid provides subsidized loans to individual members 
through village kafos using external funds. The CIDR provides only technical assistance in 
the formation of village banks called Village Savings and Credit Associations (VISACAs) 
and encourages the village kafos to participate as clients in these savings and credit 
programs.11 Action Aid does not mobilize local savings since it depends upon external 
donor funds to provide loans. In sharp contrast, the VISACAs rely almost exclusively on 
internally generated funds through village savings mobilization to supply loans to individuals 
and kafos at village determined market rates. Furthermore, while Action Aid supplies loans 
only for production purposes and for women, the VISACAs do not target any specific loan 
10 See Chapter V in Graham et al., for details about the villages where VISACAs 
function. 
11 See Chapter ll in Graham et al. for details on several NGO programs and VISACAs 
in The Gambia. 
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purpose or clientele group. The VISACAs are owned and operated by the villagers and the 
savings and loan services are based on terms and conditions proposed in village wide 
assemblies. In contrast, the terms and conditions for Action Aid loan programs are set by 
external donors. Indeed, the institutional design of the VISACAs closely emulates the 
traditional village kafos. Therefore, the VISACAs can be considered endogenous to the 
village while Action Aid is an externally imposed institution. 
ii. The Sample 
Table 2 describes the characteristics of the kafos sampled for the study. A total of 
15 kafos in the five sample villages actively engaged in some form of financial intermedia-
tion and insurance functions were identified. The survey revealed that the kafos were fairly 
homogenous in member characteristics. The criteria for membership in the kafos included, 
in order of priority, geographic proximity, gender, occupation, age and ethnicity. Whereas 
six of the kafos sampled were comprised of only men and two were comprised of only 
women, seven were mixed gender. While gender of the leader of a mixed kafo was deter-
mined by the majority gender of the members, the members of the management committee 
were comprised of both genders and were chosen democratically. The activities and bylaws 
for the provision of kafo services were decided by the members. Therefore, the terms and 
conditions for the various services including financial services reflects the revealed prefer-
ences of the villagers. The kafos were fairly large with an average membership size of 112 
members, representing nearly 70 percent of the total adult population of the village. Mem-
bership in multiple kafos were common with members participating in 2.8 kafos on average. 
10 
Several of the sampled kafos were directly or indirectly assisted by NGOs. Table 3 
classifies the kafos based on the degree of participation of NGOs in their activities. While 
seven of the kafos did not have any direct NGO participation (group I), three were used by 
Action Aid as conduits for its loans (group II), and three were creaied by Action Aid to 
provide loans while two others were created by other NGOs to provide grants (group ID).12 
Since our objective is to compare the impact of the institutional design of the VISACAs and 
Action Aid on kafos, we excluded in our analysis the two kafos that were created by other 
NGOs. The villages in our sample were serviced by both Action Aid and the VISACAs. 
However, differences exist in their use of kafos. The VISACAs encourage the kafos to 
become members of their associations in all the sample villages, while Action Aid directly 
used kafos as conduits for their loans to individual villagers. Therefore, the VISACAs 
influence kafos by their presence while Action Aid influences kafos by its direct intervention 
into kafo operations. The functions performed by the kafos were clearly influenced by the 
degree of NGO participation in their activities as will be seen in the following section. 
ill. Functions of the kafos 
The kafos, in general, performed economic activities that included the provision of 
insurance, credit and savings, labor services and social and political activities. Kafos can be 
broadly classified into four groups based on their primary functionsP 
12 On an average, the kafos in group I and II were 95 years old, while group m kafos 
were 4.5 years old. 
13 Since functions were usually overlapping, classification is not mutually exclusive as 
the observations lie along a continuum. 
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a. Insurance kafos: In general, members of these kafos (women, men or both) 
cultivated a common plot of groundnuts, cereals or vegetables, or operated common 
machinery and contributed the proceeds to a common village fund primarily used to mitigate 
village level contingencies and, to a lesser extent, member contingencies.14 The terms and 
conditions for contingency loans varied based on the composition of members and the fund 
size of a given kafo. Some kafos, especially the large ones, allocated some funds for village 
level contingencies and divided the rest among themselves instead of supplying loans to 
members.15 
b. Financial activity kafos: These kafos, in general, undertook savings and 
credit activities on an organized basis. Savings were mobilized through regular contributions 
to the savings fund that was usually nonrotating in nature and divided among members at 
the end of a specified time (ex. ramadan feast). While no interest was paid on funds 
maintained within the village, kafo funds deposited in the VISACAs and in commercial 
banks earned interest. Kafo funds were accumulated through the proceeds earned from a 
common activity, through mobilizing deposits, and through interest earnings from previous 
contingency loans to members. Considering the labor contributed to common activities as 
a type of membership fee, the design of these savings and credit kafos resembles that of 
rudimentary credit unions. Loans to kafo members to meet contingency needs were usually 
supplied from kafo funds at a group determined interest rate. Penalties for non-repayment 
14 The contingencies included medical expences, funerals and fire accidents. 
15 This is rational behavior since the size of a group is inversely proportional to the 
familiarity and linkages among its members. Therefore, the informational and peer 
monitoring advantages of group related activities declines with an increase in group size. 
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of loans included social sanctions against the family of the borrower. Rotating savings and 
credit associations (ROSCAs) are increasingly found within the kafos as a subset of kafo 
activities. There were more than one ROSCA within a kafo since the ROSCA membership 
is limited to small groups of 10-15 members of the kafo. 
Kafos that were created and used as conduits by Action Aid had an additional source 
of funds for member loans from Action Aid. This NGO primarily provided loans in kind 
to the kafos at a subsidized rate. Kafos used part of the loan for production purposes on 
their common kafo fields and lent out the rest to their members. The kafos, however, still 
engaged in organized savings and credit activities to a limited extent to supplement the 
NGO funds and provide contingency loans to members. 
c. Labor kafos: These were mutual aid kafos primarily organized to mobilize 
labor during periods of peak demand. The labor usually rotated among the member farms 
to take advantage of seasonal variations and water availability on specific plots. Some labor 
kafos also performed insurance functions for their members by supplying contingency loans 
from kafo funds. Kafo funds were accumulated through the proceeds generated from 
cultivation of a common plot. 
d. Social and political kafos: These kafos were temporary in nature and were 
usually used to organize social activities (ex. soccer club) or political rallies. While they 
collected contributions (one-time/periodic) from their members to cover their costs, they 
were not directly involved in credit and savings activities. 
Based on the above classification, the activities of the kafos before and after the entry 
of NGOs into the villages are presented in Table 4. The first important observation is that 
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the traditional kafos in Group I and IT did not disappear with the entry of NGOs into the 
villages but continued to coexist with them and continued to perform various activities. This 
indicates that the financial services of the NGOs did not fully substitute for all of the kafo 
activities. Secondly, there has been an increase in financial activities, especially ROSCA 
activities, in all three types of kafos from the time of their origin. This is markedly 
significant in kafos belonging to Group ITI. Although the increase in financial activities by 
kafos indicates increased monetization in these areas, the increase in Group IT and ill kafos 
indicates that kafos need to coexist with the NGOs to provide the full range of financial 
services demanded by villagers. In other words, the targeted production loans from Action 
Aid only partially satisfied the demand for financial services by the villagers. Kafos are 
necessary to fill in the demand for contingency credit and savings services for its members. 
While the kafos in Group I and IT have reduced their insurance functions, the kafos 
in Group ill have increased these insurance functions from the time of their origin. In 
order to further understand the reasons behind this observation, we examined the various 
functions performed by kafos and NGOs in the sample villages before and after the entry 
of NGOs (Table 5). While the Group I and IT type kafos were the primary source of 
financial and insurance services, NGOs have become an alternative financial network in the 
sample villages. Note that the VISACAs are the only NGO that participates with Group 
I kafos. Therefore, the decrease in insurance functions performed by Group I kafos can be 
explained by the ability of the VISACAs to substitute in part for the insurance functions 
performed by these kafos. This also partly explains the data in Table 4 that shows a 
decrease in the total number of activities performed by group I kafos from 23 to 18 from 
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the time of their origin. These observations underscore the importance of untargeted credit 
provided by VISACAs that can be used for consumption smoothing as an insurance 
substitute by the villagers. 
Furthermore, Table 4 also shows that the total number of activities in Group m 
kafos have increased from the time of their inception. This increase in their activities is due 
to the increase in insurance and fmancial functions performed by these kafos. Table 5 
indicates that Action Aid and the VISACAs jointly provide financial services with Group 
m kafos in the sample villages. These observations again show that financial services by 
Action Aid are only a partial substitute for kafo services. Since Action Aid provided only 
production loans, the group m kafos need to incorporate insurance functions into their 
activities to serve aggregate and member level contingencies. Also since Action Aid did not 
mobilize deposits, the kafos incorporated savings mechanisms through ROSCAs and non-
rotating savings and credit associations into their functions. As a result, group m kafos that 
were principally created to function as conduits for Action Aid and provide only financial 
services were transformed into multi-activity kafos with an emphasis on additional financial 
and insurance functions. These observations point out that the financial services of Action 
Aid only partially substitute for kafo functions and only partially satisfy the demand for a 
range of financial services in the villages. 
IV. Financial Intermediation by NGOs: Are they Complements or Substitutes ror Karos? 
The above discussion shows that the financial services of both VISACAs and Action 
Aid only partially substitute for the traditional kafo functions and that financial services are 
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only one of the services demanded by the villagers. The discussion also indicates that the 
different operational approaches employed by these NGOs influence their degree of 
substitution for traditional village kafo services. To test this hypothesis, we need to identify 
NGO institutional forms: (i) one that can effectively substitute for and expand the range of 
services of traditional kafos resulting in pareto improvement, i.e., a positive sum game, (ii) 
one that does not effectively substitute for kafo services but in a pareto optimal framework 
worsen the welfare of the village, i.e., a negative sum game, and (iii) one that complement 
the functions of the kafos resulting in a pareto improvement, ie., in positive sum game. 
Next, we examine the implications of different institutional designs of the VISACAs and 
Action Aid for the supply of services to kafos and the villages in which they are located. 
i. VISACAs and Kafos 
Although the VISACAs do not use kafos as conduits for providing financial services, 
they encourage kafos to become client-members and participate in savings and credit 
activities. Our interviews with kafo heads revealed that: 
* * Prior to creation of the VISA CAs, the common kafo funds were either left idle 
with the treasurer until some need arose, were immediately given out as loans to the 
members or were equally divided among the members to prevent their misuse by the 
treasurer. This led to indiscriminate loans to members based on a 'first come first 
served basis' since the funds had to be quickly disbursed. This resulted in an 
inefficient use of common funds. With the formation of the VISACAs, nine out of 
13 kafos in the sample deposit their common funds in these associations. In addition 
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to safety, their term deposits earn interest and their current deposits can be quickly 
withdrawn to meet kafo needs. 
* * Membership in the VISA CAs allows kafos to obtain loans that augment their 
funds to provide better services to the community. For example, one of the kafos 
had to repair its machinery but the common funds were not sufficient. Therefore, 
it obtained a loan from the VISACA to augment its common fund and repaired the 
machine. 
* * Kafo deposits increase the pool of resources available to the VISACAs for 
contingent on-lending services to the community. This leads to a more efficient use 
of kafo funds at a lesser cost to the kafos. Otherwise, kafos would need to directly 
provide all loans which involves transaction costs related to screening, monitoring and 
enforcing loan contracts. 
* * Previously, kafos did not insist on collateral, and provided loans to their members 
at arbitrarily fixed rates based on the availability of funds. Kafos are now more 
cautious in their lending activities, insist on some form of collateral, and only meet 
the demand unmet by the VISACAs. In short, the kafos have learned these practices 
from the VISACAs. 
* * The VISACAs do not target clients, loan uses or enterprises. As a result, the 
number of borrowers from the kafo funds has declined with the kafos only offering 
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emergency loans to kafo borrowers who cannot access VISACA loans at their higher 
interest rates.16 
The VISA CAs generate substantial wealth and value added in the community through 
the expansion of a growing number of individual income generation activities stimulated 
through loans. On average, three month VISACA loans to female traders generated 25 to 
720% net profits for their client-borrowers depending on the activities financed (CIDR). 
The majority of the VISACA client-borrowers deposit their surpluses in the VISACAs which 
in turn enable the VISACAs to provide more loans. Kafos also use the VISACAs to deposit 
their own common funds and provide loans to their members who cannot access loans from 
VISACAs, especially the poorer kafo members. Both the VISACAs and kafos function at 
the same time complementing each other in a healthy symbiotic fashion. The above 
observations highlights how VISACAs complement the kafos in their villages strongly 
implying an improvement in village welfare. 
Alternatively, the VISACAs substitute for some kafo functions as an alternative 
financial network in the villages. This is evident from the reported decline in the number 
of borrowers from the kafos. However, VISACAs are more directed towards individuals 
than to groups within the village. The growth of the VISACAs may come at the expense 
of contributions to kafos due to the shift from collective risk sharing practiced in kafos to 
individual risk management followed by their members in the VISACAs. Consequently, this 
will reduce the supply of kafo funds and the access of the marginal populations to village 
16 The reasons for non accessibility to VISACA loans may be due to lack of collateral, 
a short fall in the VISACA funds, and the limited number of days the VISACAs are able 
to service clients. They are only open once a week. 
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contingency and insurance funds. In other words, if some kafo member contributors choose 
to drop out of their kafos or reduce their kafo contributions because of their increased 
accessibility to VISACA financial services, then the size of available kafo funds will decline. 
It is true that the asset rich and able bodied members of the kafos will have better access 
to VISACA services than marginal members of the kafos. In this case, the VISACAs 
substituting for the financial and insurance services provided by the kafos could result in a 
worsening of welfare for the marginal members of the kafos. It is relevant to note, however, 
that traditional kafos coexist with the VISACAs and continue to provide insurance and 
financial functions to marginal members who lack access to VISACAs. This strongly 
suggests that VISACAs are not perfect or complete substitutes for the range of financial 
services supplied by kafos but are only substitutes for a subset of these services (loans and 
savings) and that there is likely no loss in aggregate village welfare. 
It is difficult to conclude if VISACAs substitute or complement the kafos. Indeed, 
the VISACAs both complement and partially substitute for kafo services, but the net effect 
is a likely pareto improvement in village welfare. This indicates that an NGO design that 
does not directly interfere into the kafo activities but gives great fleXIbility for the villagers 
to define their own arrangements, provides untargeted financial services and is based on the 
principles of kafos serves the community in a positive way. 
U. Action Aid and Kafos 
Our earlier discussion showed that the financial services provided by Action Aid only 
partially substituted for the traditional financial activities of the kafos so they continued to 
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:oexist with Action Aid to provide all the financial services demanded by villagers. Our 
:nterviews with kafo heads revealed that: 
* * In kind loans issued by Action Aid to the kafos were often inadequate to meet 
all member needs. Therefore, loan quantity rationing existed in which loan 
applicants were rejected completely along with loan size rationing where borrowers 
were provided with smaller sized loans than demanded. Some smaller kafos, 
however, divided equally among their members the total quantity of inputs provided 
by Action Aid. 
* * Loans were provided to kafos by Action Aid at a zero to 12 percent annual 
interest rate, considerably below the kafo and VISACA rates. The kafos, in general, 
passed on this interest subsidy to their borrowers. Kafos that use their own funds to 
provide member loans, however, charged a 20..25% annual interest rate while 
VISACAs charged 40-60 percent. 
* * No collateral except for group liability was required for loans provided by Action 
Aid. 
** Since Action Aid targets women and prefers lending to women kafos, two women 
kafos were created out of the existing kafo to obtain the loans. However, the loans 
were not used by the women since few women purchase chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides for use in their coarse grain production. Instead, the loans were diverted 
to men in the original kafo who then frequently defaulted on loan repayments. 
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Action Aid was not very strict in its loan enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, 
repayment rates for Action Aid loans were less than 42 percent. This is in sharp contrast 
to the 90-95 percent repayment rates observed with loans provided through kafos and 
VISACAs. Also, Action Aid funds for loans to kafo members came from external sources 
at a subsidized rate. There is no doubt that the additional funds from an external source 
at a subsidized rate increased the pool of resources available to the community. However, 
the institutional design based on external help, subsidies and a credit first approach creates 
a negative externality in the community. For example, the kafos work together and mobilize 
deposits to build a common fund which is used to provide loans to their members. 
Institutional safeguards are devised to screen and monitor borrowers and enforce loan 
contracts through collective efforts of the kafo. A donor virus can erode these carefully 
built institutional safeguards of the traditional kafos with respect to loan repayment and 
savings behavior. The poor loan recovery that characterizes the Action Aid loan portfolio 
could begin to contaminate the kafo loan activity. Furthermore, kafos may become 
increasingly dependent on external and subsidized assistance. In the worst case scenario, 
kafos might discontinue their insurance and financial services. This would have a negative 
impact on the marginal kafo members in the village. Also, if the current low loan 
repayment continues, Action Aid may discontinue its assistance to the villages. With the 
demise of the kafos, the village will then be left without any alternative insurance and 
financial mechanism until it incurs the transaction costs of rebuilding its kafo. Thus the 
partial substitution of Action Aid for kafo financial services through its current operational 
approach results in a negative sum game and worsens the aggregate welfare of the 
21 
community. This might appear to be an overly romantized interpretation of the implications 
of Action Aid on the kafos and welfare of the village. But, it highlights the long-term 
dynamic issues that arise from NGOs that intervene in rural communities with externally 
defined financial programs. 
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Kafos have traditionally provided a variety of services including insurance, financial 
intermediation, labor services and social and political services in Gambian villages. 
Recently, NGOs have expanded rapidly into villages and are now providing financial 
services. They follow diverse institutional designs in the provision of financial services 
including use of traditional kafos as conduits. This expansion of NGOs into rural areas and 
use of kafos can have implications for traditional village self-help groups and the services 
they provide villagers, especially the marginal kafo members. Consequently, the aggregate 
welfare of the village may be enhanced or undermined by NGO presence and intervention 
into traditional kafo activities. This study attempted to address this issue. 
The study shows that the financial services provided by both VISACAs and Action 
Aid complement kafos to a certain extent but are only partial substitutes for kafo activities. 
Marginal members of kafos are, however, not directly serviced by both VISACAs and Action 
Aid. Nonetheless, the non intervention policy of the VISACAs into kafo activities and their 
untargeted loans provided from locally mobilized deposits at village determined interest 
rates are likely to produce a positive benefits for kafos. The aggregate welfare of the village 
is likely to increase or at least remain unaffected. In contrast, the targeted loans from 
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Action Aid at subsidized interest rates using external funds seem to negatively influence 
kafos by eroding their carefully built institutional safeguards. As a result, the Action Aid 
program, in addition to only partially substituting for kafo activities, lowers the aggregate 
village welfare. It may be presumptious at this stage to conclude which of the various NGO 
institutional designs is ideal for The Gambia ensuring that aggregate village welfare could 
be increased unambiguosly. Nonetheless, we can conclude from the above discussions that 
the VISACAs are preferable to the Action Aid program in our sample villages. In other 
words VISACAs pareto dominates the Action Aid programs.17 
The obvious policy implication is that an externally defined institution that directly 
intervenes into traditional village structures with rudimentary financial technology is pareto 
inferior to a non interfering institution that complements traditional village kafos. NGOs 
should take care such that the use of informal traditional groups as conduits to channel 
external donor funds do not damage the roots of these traditional systems (Cuevas). 
17 Both VISACAs and Action Aid function in the same sample villages with possible 
interaction effects on one another and kafos. Therefore, this study is limited by its inability 
to effectively separate the presence effect of the VISACAs from the intervention effect of the 
Action Aid. Nonetheless, the results of the study are robust enough for policy implications. 
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Table 1. Operational Characteristics of Selected NGO Designs in Providing Financial 
Services in The Gambia. 
Items 
1. Status 
2. Sponsors 
3. Organizational design features 
a. Operational philosophy 
b. Source of funds for financial 
services 
c. Financial services offered 
d. Geographic coverage 
e. Target clientele 
f. Mode of reaching clientele 
g. Target enterprise 
4. Terms and conditions and 
instruments used 
a. Principal Type of loans 
b. Type of saving accounts 
c. Loan int.rate (% Jyr) 
d. Savings int.rate (% /yr) 
e. Collateral 
5. Subsidy component 
a. External technical assistance 
b. Operational costs 
AATG: Action Aid; The Gambia 
NGOs 
Inti. 
UKC 
Encourage income 
generating activities 
and local organizations 
External 
Credit, Compulsory 
savings 
Rural 
VISACAsb 
Hybrid 
CIDR/KFWd 
Provide unsubsidized 
financial services 
All local savings 
Credit and Savings 
Rural 
Women and Farmers Untargeted 
Mostly kafo groups and Mostly individuals and 
some Individuals some kafo groups 
Agrl. Untargeted 
Short term, In-kind 
loans 
Compulsory fixed 
deposit held in central 
office 
0-12 
0 
Group liability 
High 
High 
Short term, cash loans 
Current and fixed 
deposits held in local 
units 
40-60 
20-40 
Animals, farm imple-
ments and jewelry 
Moderate 
None 
a. 
b. 
c. 
VISACA: Village Savings and Credit Associations 
UK: United Kingdom 
CIDR/KFW: Centre International de Developpment et de Rechesche/Kreditanstalt d. 
fur Wiederaufbau 
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Table 2. Sample Villages, Kafos and NGOs present in the Sampled Villages. 
Particulars 
No. of Sample Villages 
NGOs present 
No. of sample Kafos 
Male kafos 
Female kafos 
Mixed gender kafos 
Kafo Characteristics 
Average membership size 
5 
Action Aid, CIDR, Catholic Relief 
Services 
15 
6 
2 
7 
112 
Average number of activities 3.1 
Average number of kafos participated 2.8 
per member 
Membership Criteria for the Kafos (percent of kafos reportin2) 
by Geographic proximity 85 
by Gender and occupation 62 
by Age and Ethnicity 30 
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Table 3. Sample Kafos Classified by Degree of NGO Involvement in Kafo Activities 
Particulars Kafo Types 
Group 1• Group II" Group me 
Male kafos 3 1 2 
Female kafos 0 0 1 
Mixed gender kafos 4 2 0 
Total 7 3 3 
a. Group I kafos do not have any direct involvement with NGOs. 
b. Group n kafos are used as conduits by Action Aid 
c. Group m kafos were created by Action Aid to function as its conduits. 
Total 
6 
1 
6 
13 
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Table 4. Kafo Activities Before and After the NGO Entry and Involvement in Kafo 
Activities 
Kafo Types 
Particulars Group P Group nt' Group me 
Originald Current" Original Curren Original Current 
t 
Sample Size (No. of kafos) 7 7 3 3 3 3 
Kafo Activities (No. of kafos reporting) 
Insurance 7 4 3 2 2 3 
Labor 5 2 2 3 2 2 
F'mancial 6 7 2 3 0 4 
Non-rotating 5 5 2 2 0 2 
savings and 
credit 
ROSCAs 1 2 0 2 0 2 
Social and Political 5 5 2 2 1 2 
Total No. of activitiest 23 18 9 10 5 11 
a. Group I kafos do not have any direct involvement with NGOs. 
b. Group n kafos are used as conduits by Action Aid 
c. Group m kafos were created by Action Aid to function as its conduits. 
d. Original refers to the time when the kafos were originally created. 
e. Current refers to the status in 1993. 
f. Numbers will not add up to sample size due to multiple activities reported by the kafos. 
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Table 5. Functions Performed by K.afos and NGOs in Sample Villages 
K.afo Groups Functions 
Insurance Labor Financial Social and 
Political 
Group 18 
Originalb Kafo Kafo Kafo K.afo 
Currentc Kafo Kafo Kafo and Kafo 
VISACA 
Group lid 
Original Kafo Kafo Kafo K.afo 
Current Kafo Kafo Kafo, Action Kafo 
Aid, VISACA 
Group Ille 
Original K.afo Kafo Action Aid Kafo 
Current Kafo Kafo Kafo, Action K.afo 
Aid, VISACA 
a. Group I kafos do not have any direct involvement with NGOs. 
b. Original refers to the time when the kafos were originally created. 
c. Current refers to the status in 1993. 
d. Group II kafos are used as conduits by Action Aid 
e. Group ill kafos were created by Action Aid to function as its conduits. 

